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Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West 
Development, Inc.: An Analysis of Shareholder 
Derivative Suits in Closely Held Corporations 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate laws that govern derivative suits attempt to dictate the 
type of lawsuit a shareholder may file on behalf of a corporation. 
These laws often protect the corporation at the expense of individual 
shareholders. A problem arises when a closely held corporation, op-
erated and controlled by the majority shareholders, suffers a harm 
caused by its own board members. A strict interpretation of corpo-
rate law requires a shareholder that wants to pursue this claim on be-
half of the corporation to make demand on the board of directors. 
The board then has to agree to instigate an action against itself on 
behalf of the corporation for the harm it caused.1 As a result of this 
problem, a conflict of interest arises for the board members to main-
tain their fiduciary duty to look after the corporation’s best interests, 
but at the same time not agree to put themselves in a position to be 
held liable for the damages that they have caused. Hence, most di-
rectors or officers of closely held corporations do not agree to insti-
gate the action demanded by the shareholder, and thus, the minority 
shareholders are left with little remedy. To resolve this concern, 
some courts have recognized “the right of a close corporation share-
holder to sue directly, as an individual, on a cause of action which 
would normally have to be brought derivatively.”2 
In Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc.,3 
the Utah district court faced this exact problem. The court dismissed 
Aurora Credit Services’ (“Aurora”) direct claims against Liberty West 
Development (“LWD”) and granted LWD’s motion for partial 
 
 1. The board of directors usually decides which claims the corporation will pursue. 
However, this “presents an obvious problem when the prospective lawsuit is against the direc-
tors themselves.” FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.3, at 387 (Hornbook Se-
ries 2000). 
 2. 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 59.11.50 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2000). 
 3. 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998). 
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summary judgment regarding the derivative claims. The Utah district 
court stated that Aurora did not have standing to sue derivatively. 
However, on November 24, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court’s decision and adopted an approach promul-
gated by the American Law Institute, which holds that under certain 
circumstances a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation 
can sue directly “on a cause of action which would normally have to 
be brought derivatively.”4 In the process of deciding the Aurora 
case, the Utah Supreme Court also held for the first time that a 
shareholder who sues a corporation directly has to satisfy the con-
temporaneous ownership requirement of Utah Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23.1.5 
This Note will discuss why the Utah Supreme Court correctly 
decided to provide minority shareholders with a method of recourse 
other than a derivative suit, but will also illustrate the flaws in the 
court’s holding that a direct action must now satisfy the contempo-
raneous ownership requirement. One such flaw is that the language 
the Utah Supreme Court used in fashioning the contemporaneous 
ownership requirement for direct actions was too broad and can be 
interpreted to apply not only to situations in which a minority share-
holder is suing a closely held corporation directly, but also to any 
other direct action that a shareholder may file for unique wrongs sus-
tained by that individual shareholder. Another problem with the 
court’s holding is that the purpose of the contemporaneous owner-
ship requirement in avoiding strike suits is not applicable to closely 
held corporations. This Note proposes that a shareholder of a closely 
held corporation should not be required to satisfy the contempora-
neous ownership requirement when a direct action is substituted for 
a derivative action. 
The analysis of the two Aurora holdings will proceed as follows: 
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of corporate law, ex-
plains the distinguishing differences between a shareholder derivative 
suit and direct actions by shareholders against the corporation, and 
also provides an overview of the contemporaneous ownership re-
 
 4. 12B FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 59.11.50. 
 5. The contemporaneous ownership rule requires a shareholder to prove that she was a 
shareholder at the time the corporation was harmed in order to commence a derivative pro-
ceeding against the corporation. Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1; see also 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER 
ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5981 (perm. ed., 
rev. vol. 1995). 
5YAT.DOC 3/23/02  8:58 AM 
175] Derivative Suits in Closely Held Corporations 
 177 
quirement. Part III sets forth the facts of Aurora and briefly dis-
cusses the significance of the Utah Supreme Court’s decision to al-
low minority shareholders to sue corporate officers directly. Part IV 
establishes the three options the Utah Supreme Court had in decid-
ing the case and analyzes why the Aurora decision correctly allowed 
minority shareholders, under certain circumstances, to sue a closely 
held corporation directly. Part IV also analyzes why the Utah Su-
preme Court incorrectly applied the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 to direct actions 
filed by individual shareholders and why the court incorrectly as-
sumed that the efficient market theory applies not only to publicly 
traded corporations, but also to closely held corporations. A brief 
conclusion will follow in Part V. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. General Corporate Law 
 A corporation is a legal person separate from its shareholders 
and is entitled to its own profits and to the rights of any derivative 
action brought by shareholders on its behalf.6 “A corporation is, in 
its very nature, an entity operating for the benefit of its stockhold-
ers.”7 An owner or shareholder of a corporation is one “who owns or 
holds a share or shares” in a corporation.8 “The distinguishing char-
acteristics of a corporation are that it is an artificial person, a legal en-
tity, capable of acting through its corporate officers and agents, of 
suing, being sued, of taking and holding property, and of contract-
ing in its own name, and of continuing to exist independent of indi-
viduals who compose it.”9 
 
 6. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2250 (1986) [hereinafter Corporations]; “A ‘corpo-
ration’ is an artificial person, which is created by law, or under authority of law, as a distinct 
legal entity with rights and liabilities which are independent from those of the natural persons 
composing the corporation.” Di Re v. Cent. Livestock Order Buying Co., 74 N.W. 2d 518, 
523 (Minn. 1956); “A ‘corporation’ is a legal entity separate and distinct from its stockholders 
and continuity of its existence is not interrupted by change in stock ownership.” Joe Balestrieri 
& Co. v. Comm’r, 177 F.2d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 1949). 
 7. See Van Meter v. Comm’r, 61 F.2d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 1932). 
 8. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (7th ed. 1999). 
 9. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999); see also Orlob v. Wasatch Mgmt., 33 
P.3d 1078, 1082 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (stating that a corporation “is an entity separate and 
distinct from its officers, shareholders, and directors and that they will not be held personally 
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B. Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits Versus  
Shareholder Direct Lawsuits 
Because a corporation is a separate legal entity, the corporation’s 
shareholders are generally not liable for any harm that the corpora-
tion may cause. Likewise, when a corporation is injured or harmed in 
any way the cause of action belongs to the corporation and not to 
the individual shareholders.10 A shareholder in a corporation “may 
not bring suit, individually, when the whole body of stockholders is 
injured.”11 However, when “the injury is one to the plaintiff as a 
stockholder and to him individually, and not the corporation, as 
where the action is based on a contract to which he is a party, or on 
a right to which he is a party, or on a right belonging severally to 
him, or on a fraud affecting him directly, it is an individual action,” 
and the shareholder can pursue this action directly.12 Hence, when 
the corporation or entire body of shareholders is injured and the 
corporation fails to take action, the action still lies with the corpora-
tion and is derivative in nature,13 but when the injury is to the stock-
holder individually, the action lies with the shareholder and is direct 
in nature. 
As discussed previously, “courts allow derivative suits in order to 
avoid leaving directors in charge of whether to have the corporation 
 
liable for the corporation’s debts and obligations”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. 
R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley, 
108 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. 1954) (“A corporation is a distinct and separate entity, irrespective of 
the persons who own all its stock.”)). 
 10. See Richardson v. Ariz. Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 638 (Utah 1980) (“The stock-
holder .  .  . has no right, title or interest whatsoever in the claim itself—whether the action is 
brought by the corporation or by the stockholder on behalf of the corporation .  .  . the plain-
tiff shareholder recovers nothing and the judgment runs in favor of the corporation.”). 
 11. Corporations, supra note 6, § 2245; “The only two exceptions to the general rule 
that shareholders cannot pursue individual causes of action against third parties for wrongs or 
injuries to the corporation that result in the diminution or destruction of the value of their 
stock are: (1) a plaintiff alleges an injury separate and distinct to himself; or (2) the injuries 
arise out of a special duty running from the alleged wrongdoer to the plaintiff.” Id. § 2245 
(Supp. 2001) (citing Energy Investors Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 525 S.E.2d 
441 (N.C. 2000)). 
 12. Richardson, 614 P.2d at 639 (citing 12B FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 5911). 
 13. “A stockholder’s derivative action is an action brought by one or more stockholders 
of a corporation to enforce a corporate right or remedy a wrong to the corporation in cases 
where the corporation, because it is controlled by the wrongdoers or for other reasons, fails 
and refuses to take appropriate action for its own protection.” Corporations, supra note 6, § 
2250; see also Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ohio 1989) (“A derivative action allows 
a shareholder to circumvent a board’s refusal to bring a suit on a claim.”). 
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sue either the directors themselves or a party who controls the direc-
tors.”14 Courts have ruled that “[a] diminution in value of a share-
holder’s stock is a loss recoverable only by the corporation and does 
not give rise to an individual cause of action. Thus, courts have held 
that a shareholder does not have standing to bring a direct cause of 
action when the damage alleged is the diminished value of corporate 
shares.”15 Stated another way, “[a]n action brought by a stockholder 
is derivative if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corpo-
ration or to the whole body of its stock or property and not injury to 
the plaintiff’s individual interest as a stockholder.”16 
In its classic form, a derivative suit involves two actions brought by 
an individual shareholder: (i) an action against the corporation for 
failing to bring a specified suit and (ii) an action on behalf of the 
corporation for harm to it identical to the one which the corpora-
tion failed to bring. . . . Since any judgment runs to the corpora-
tion, shareholder plaintiffs at best realize an appreciation in the 
value of their shares.17 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 lists the procedural require-
ments that a derivative lawsuit must meet prior to the court hearing 
the action. Rule 23.1 states: 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or 
members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorpo-
rated association, the corporation or association having failed to en-
force a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint 
shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a share-
holder or member at the time of the transaction of which he com-
plains or that his share or membership devolved on him by opera-
 
 14. GEVURTZ, supra note 1, § 4.3.8, at 425. 
 15. See Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406, 411 (D. Utah 1988). 
 16. Corporations, supra note 6, § 2250; “[A]n individual stockholder has no right to 
bring an action in his own name and in his own behalf for a wrong committed solely against 
the corporation.” Id. § 2245. 
 17. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted); “A derivative 
suit permits a shareholder to sue on behalf of the corporate entity to remedy or prevent a 
wrong to the corporation. A derivative action is an exception to the usual rule that a corpora-
tion’s board of directors manages it or supervises its management and thereby controls its deci-
sions.” Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 798 (N.D. 1991) (quoting F. HODGE 
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.11 (3d ed. 1987)); 
see also GEVURTZ, supra note 1, § 4.3.1(b), at 392 (“[A] derivative suit is two suits in one: An 
action against those who breached their duty to the corporation, and an action against the cor-
poration to compel the company to pursue this claim.”). 
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tion of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer 
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not 
otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity 
the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he de-
sires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, 
from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure 
to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The derivative ac-
tion may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or 
members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation 
or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised 
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dis-
missal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in 
such manner as the court directs.18 
A careful reading of the rule shows that the shareholder must (1) 
show that she was a shareholder at the time the corporation suffered 
harm; (2) show that the action is not a collusive one intended to ob-
tain jurisdiction in a federal court;19 (3) demand that the corporation 
pursue the claim or show why such demand would be futile; and (4) 
show how the shareholder will be able to adequately represent all 
similarly situated shareholders. 
 
 
 18. Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1. See also Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 which states, in 
almost identical language to the Utah rule: 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a 
right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or asso-
ciation having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the 
complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or 
member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the 
plaintiff’s share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of 
law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of 
the United States which it would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege 
with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the 
plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from 
the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the 
action or for not making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it 
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation 
or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the ap-
proval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be 
given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (emphasis added). 
 19. This requirement is not applicable to the Aurora case because the action was filed in 
state court. 
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A major requirement that the Utah legislature has enacted 
through Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 is referred to as the con-
temporaneous ownership requirement.20 This requirement is pat-
terned after a similar requirement contained in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. It provides that a shareholder may not commence 
“or maintain a derivative proceeding unless the shareholder was a 
shareholder of the corporation at the time of the act or omission 
complained of.”21 “The primary purpose for the contemporaneous 
ownership rule is to prevent ‘strike suits,’ where individuals purchase 
shares in a corporation with litigious motives.”22 Stated another way, 
the contemporaneous ownership doctrine prevents courts “from be-
ing used to litigate purchased grievances or from becoming a party 
to speculative suits against corporations.”23 
The contemporaneous ownership requirement is premised upon 
the “efficient market theory,” which presupposes that all stock is 
traded on an efficient market. Without the contemporaneous owner-
ship requirement, “subsequent purchasers of shares could reap a 
windfall from any recovery in a derivative proceeding which was not 
considered in the purchase price of their shares.”24 The efficient mar-
ket theory “posits that the price of a security reflects all publicly 
available information about a firm, and that prices react almost in-
stantaneously and in an unbiased manner to any new information.”25 
“Researchers agree that the efficient capital market model accurately 
represents the pricing behavior of stocks.”26 The contemporaneous 
ownership requirement relies on the efficient market theory because 
it assumes that when a new stockholder buys into a corporation that 
all material, relevant information will be used to price the stock in an 
efficient market. Thus, if the corporation is involved in outstanding 
litigation, the stock price will already reflect the litigation. Therefore, 
 
 20. Other state legislatures have also enacted the contemporaneous ownership require-
ment. See, e.g., Del. Ct. Ch. R. 23.1. See also HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW 
OF CORPORATIONS § 362 (3d ed. 1983) (“Perhaps the most important qualification placed 
upon a plaintiff-shareholder in a derivative action is that of ‘contemporaneous-
shareownership.’”). 
 21. 13 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 5981. 
 22. Id. § 5981.10. 
 23. See Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 24. 13 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 5981.10. 
 25. Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for 
the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374–75 (1984). 
 26. Id. at 374. 
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according to the contemporaneous ownership requirement, if stock-
holders were allowed to buy the stock after the “time of the act or 
omission complained of,”27 then stockholders would receive a wind-
fall if they also were able to participate in the recovery of the litiga-
tion.28 
Another major requirement of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
23.1 is that the complaint must allege the efforts of the plaintiff to 
make demand on the directors to enforce the right that belongs to 
the corporation, or, if demand is not made, the “reasons . . . for not 
making the effort.”29 The demand requirement “is not merely a 
technical pleading hurdle; it is based on a fundamental tenet of 
American corporate law that places the responsibility for making de-
cisions in the hands of the board of directors.”30 However, once the 
directors refuse to comply with the demand, “[a] derivative action 
allows a shareholder to circumvent a board’s refusal to bring a suit 
on a claim.”31 However, if a derivative action is in fact brought and 
an advantageous outcome results, any proceeds belong to the corpo-
ration and not to the individual shareholder. 
The demand requirement assumes that the shareholder is dealing 
with a disinterested board when seeking to have the corporation 
bring suit because of the alleged wrong. A disinterested board is a 
board that does not have any type of conflict of interest in deciding 
upon the corporation’s claim. The disinterested board would there-
fore consider the plaintiff’s complaint and make a decision that is 
best for the corporation. 
In addition to these requirements, many states have enacted laws 
that require plaintiffs to post security for costs of the lawsuit if the 
plaintiff owns less than five percent of the outstanding shares.32 The 
purpose of these statutes is also to prevent strike suits or actions that 
 
 27. 13 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 5981. 
 28. Once the corporation recovers proceeds through the litigation, the stock price will 
increase, thus resulting in a windfall to the shareholder. 
 29. UTAH R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
 30. Johnson v. Hui, 752 F. Supp. 909, 911 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (demand excused when 
six of eight directors were accused of illegal activity (citing In re BankAmerica Sec. Litig., 636 
F. Supp. 419, 420 (C.D. Cal. 1986)). 
 31. Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ohio 1989). 
 32. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Magaziner, 210 A.2d 890, 894 (Pa. 1965); see also Haberman v. 
Tobin, 626 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980); Levine v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620, 623 (3d Cir. 1967); 
Mintz v. Allen, 254 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Tyler v. Gas Consumers Ass’n, 229 
N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). 
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have the sole purpose of winning large attorney’s fees, but with no 
intention of benefiting the corporation.33 “[S]uch strike suits were 
usually brought by shareholders with only a small financial stake in 
the corporation and who, therefore, had little to lose by starting an 
action.”34 As previously stated above, a strike suit is defined as “a suit 
by a holder of a miniscule interest in the corporation to harass and 
coerce the directors into a settlement far out of proportion to the 
minority shareholder’s financial interest in the object of the suit.”35 
C. Closely Held Corporations 
A closely held corporation has been defined in a number of 
ways.36 “By definition, a close corporation is one in which the stock 
is held in a few hands, or in a few families, and wherein it is not at 
all, or only rarely, bought or sold.”37 The definition of a closely held 
corporation that is adopted for the purposes of this Note is found in 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., which states 
 
 33. See Levine, 378 F.2d at 624. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Petty v. Bank of N.M. Holding Co., 787 P.2d 443, 452 (N.M. 1990). 
 36. See Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964); see also W & W Equip. Co. v. 
Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“A close corporation is one which typically 
has relatively few shareholders and whose shares are not generally traded in the securities mar-
ket.” (citing O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, § 1.02)); Berreman v. W. Publ’g Co., 615 
N.W.2d 362, 367–68 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (defining close corporation as a corporation with 
few shareholders, no public market for its stock, active shareholder management within the 
corporation, and shareholder income derived primarily from salary not dividends); Thisted v. 
Tower Mgmt. Corp., 409 P.2d 813, 820 (Mont. 1966) (noting “that a close corporation is 
one in which management and ownership are ‘substantially identical to the extent that it is un-
realistic to believe that the judgment of the directors will be independent of that of the stock-
holders’”(citation omitted)); Landstrom v. Shaver, 1997 SD 25, 561 N.W.2d 1, 13 n.15 
(1997) (“Typical attributes of a close corporation are that: (1) the shareholders are few in 
number, often two or three; (2) the shareholders usually live in the same geographical area, 
know each other, and are well acquainted with each others’ skills in regards to the corporation; 
(3) all or most of the shareholders are active in the business usually serving as directors or offi-
cers or as management; and (4) there is no established market for the corporate stock.” (citing 
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987)); Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 674–
75 (Va. 2001) (asserting that “the most precise definition [of a close corporation] may be im-
perfect to every occasion”; however, the court noted that the corporation in question had “a 
small number of shareholders with no active trading market for their shares, and substantial 
majority stockholder participation in the management, direction, and operations of the corpo-
ration”); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1980) (“A ‘close corporation’ 
has been defined as a corporation with a small number of shareholders whose shares are not 
generally traded in the securities market.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 1999) 
(“A corporation whose stock is not freely traded and is held by only a few shareholders.”). 
 37. Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224, 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). 
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that a close corporation is defined as a corporation with: “(1) a small 
number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; 
and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the man-
agement, direction and operations of the corporation.”38 Generally, a 
publicly held corporation is at the opposite end of the spectrum in 
that it has a large number of shareholders, a national market on 
which its stock is traded, and less majority participation in the man-
agement and operation of the corporation. The differences between 
a publicly held corporation and a closely held corporation explain 
why in certain circumstances differing laws should be applied regard-
ing shareholder derivative lawsuits and the contemporaneous owner-
ship requirement. 
III. AURORA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Dennis W. Gay, James Hogle, Jr., and two other individuals 
formed LWD in 1986 to develop an office complex in Ogden, 
Utah.39 To finance the office complex, LWD borrowed money using 
the office complex as collateral.40 Both Gay and Hogle controlled the 
operation of LWD—Hogle was president of LWD from 1986 to 
1991 and Gay served as CEO from 1990 until the company’s disso-
lution.41 
By 1990, the initial loan used by LWD to finance the office 
complex was in arrears.42 LWD also owed on several other out-
standing loans, and there were several liens placed against the office 
complex.43 During this same time period, Hogle was also suffering 
from personal financial distress.44 For example, “Union National 
Bank of Chicago sued Hogle for an unrelated debt and obtained a 
money judgment against him.”45 In February of 1991, while Hogle 
was still president of LWD, he “executed a security agreement in fa-
vor of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) in 
which he pledged his 2,500 shares of LWD stock as collateral for the 
 
 38. 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975). 
 39. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Utah 
1998). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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judgment.”46 At the time of the pledge, Hogle valued the pledged 
LWD stock at $200,000.47 
Subsequently, in November of 1991, Aurora bought a “package 
of assets from the FDIC at a judgment auction.”48 Included in this 
package was the judgment that the FDIC had against Hogle.49 Upon 
purchasing the assets, Aurora approached Hogle in December of 
1991 and offered to settle the entire judgment, which was at that 
point approximately $125,000, for $87,500.50 Hogle never re-
sponded to Aurora’s offer.51 In January of 1992, Aurora received the 
formal assignment from the FDIC of the Hogle judgment, “includ-
ing its security interest in Hogle’s LWD stock.”52 Shortly thereafter, 
Aurora notified LWD and Gay of the security interest it received 
from the FDIC in Hogle’s LWD shares.53 In April 1993, Aurora 
foreclosed on its interest in the LWD stock, thereby becoming a 
stockholder of the corporation.54 
In early 1991, Restaurant Store & Equipment Supply Co. (“Res-
taurant Co.”) sued LWD and obtained a judgment for the nonpay-
ment of a contract.55 Shortly thereafter, a writ of execution was ob-
tained, a levy was recorded on the office complex, and on May 15, 
1991 the office complex was sold to Restaurant Co. at a sheriff’s 
sale.56 The sheriff recorded the sale and notified LWD of its six-
month statutory right of redemption.57 LWD never redeemed the 
property because less than a week after the property was sold to Res-
taurant Co., the property was sold to XM International (“XMI”), a 
partnership formed by Gay and George Bybee.58 
Despite the sale of the property to Restaurant Co. and then to 
XMI, LWD represented to Aurora that it still owned the property 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1275–76. 
 52. Id. at 1276. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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and that it was trying to sell the property.59 Furthermore, LWD told 
Aurora that it “expected to recover $800,000 to $1,000,000 of eq-
uity in the property.”60 These representations were made to Aurora 
until July 7, 1993.61 
After receiving the news that LWD no longer owned the prop-
erty, Aurora filed a complaint in Utah district court on August 5, 
1994.62 Aurora later amended its complaint on October 17, 1994, 
“asserting both derivative and direct claims alleging that Gay negli-
gently and intentionally mismanaged LWD, breached his fiduciary 
duties, and wasted corporate assets.”63 The Utah district court dis-
missed Aurora’s direct claims on December 12, 1994 and on De-
cember 20, 1995 granted LWD’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment holding that Aurora did not have standing to sue because 
“Aurora was not a shareholder of LWD when the alleged injury oc-
curred.”64 Aurora moved to amend its complaint after both the mo-
tion dismissing its direct claims and the summary judgment motion 
dismissing its derivative claims were granted.65 Both motions were 
denied, so Aurora appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.66 
On November 24, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment of the lower court.67 The two issues that the Utah Su-
preme Court decided in Aurora were of first impression in the state 
of Utah. The court held that in a closely held corporation a minority 
shareholder could proceed directly against corporate officers.68 The 
court also held that the contemporaneous ownership requirement, 
which prior to this judgment applied only to derivative suits, applied 
to suits filed as direct actions.69 The court’s holding does allow for 
certain exceptions to the contemporaneous ownership requirement 
given the appropriate circumstances; however, these exceptions are 
irrelevant for the purpose of this Note because this Note proposes 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1282. 
 68. Id. at 1281. 
 69. Id. 
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that the contemporaneous ownership requirement should never ap-
ply to direct actions in a closely held corporation. This Note will 
proceed to analyze the two holdings of the Utah Supreme Court and 
discuss the reasons why the Utah Supreme Court correctly held that 
a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation could sue the 
corporation directly. This Note will also discuss why the Utah Su-
preme Court incorrectly applied the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement to direct actions filed by individual shareholders in a 
closely held corporation. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Aurora should have a de-
cided impact on how corporate matters are resolved. Many officers 
and directors of closely held corporations could face direct litigation 
for any type of mismanagement of corporate assets. Ultimately, the 
Aurora decision blurred what had previously been a clear distinction 
between direct lawsuits and derivative lawsuits.70 The Aurora deci-
sion will allow what were in past decisions derivative actions to be 
filed as direct actions by an individual shareholder against a closely 
held corporation. The decision will also deny recovery to any share-
holder of a closely held corporation that buys into the corporation at 
a price that was not set by an “efficient market” by not allowing the 
shareholder to recoup the difference in price from the corporation as 
the result of advantageous litigation. In consequence, this Note rec-
ommends that the Utah Supreme Court in future decisions not apply 
the contemporaneous ownership requirement to direct actions of 
shareholders in closely held corporations. 
A. Closely Held Corporations and Derivative Lawsuits 
Based on prior Utah precedent, the Aurora claims were clearly 
derivative in nature. In Utah, “mismanagement of the corporation 
gives rise to a cause of action in the corporation, even if the man-
agement results in damage to stockholders by depreciating the value 
of the corporation’s stock.”71 Prior to the Aurora case, Utah law was 
very clear as to the differences between a derivative and direct action. 
 
 70. Richardson v. Ariz. Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980). 
 71. Id. at 640 (citing Morris v. Ogden State Bank, 28 P.2d 138 (Utah 1934) (citing 3B 
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.1.16[1] (2d ed. 1980) and 
12B FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 5911)). 
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The Utah Supreme Court in Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp. 
stated: 
Suits which are said to be derivative, and therefore come within the 
rule [Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1], are those which seek to 
enforce any right which belongs to the corporation and is not be-
ing enforced, such as the liability of corporate officers or majority 
shareholders for mismanagement, to recover corporate assets and 
related claims, to enforce rights of the corporation by virtue of its 
contract with a third person, and to enjoin those in charge of the 
corporation from causing it to commit an ultra vires act. On the 
other hand, if the injury is one to the plaintiff as a stockholder and 
to him individually, and not to the corporation, as where the action 
is based on a contract to which he is a party, or on a right belong-
ing severally to him, or on a fraud affecting him directly, it is an in-
dividual action.72 
The Utah Supreme Court’s holding that minority shareholders 
in a closely held corporation can sue the corporate officers directly 
will drastically affect corporate officer decision-making because direc-
tors of closely held corporations will now possibly be sued directly 
for any mismanagement of corporate assets. Prior to the Aurora 
case, courts across America adopted one of three approaches in deal-
ing with shareholder lawsuits in closely held corporations. 
1. Traditional approach of treating closely held corporations by the 
letter of the law 
The traditional approach, adopted by, among other states, Dela-
ware, is that the rules that apply to large publicly held corporations 
should also apply to closely held corporations, meaning that share-
holder derivative laws apply to closely held corporations.73 An impor-
tant case in the development of the traditional approach is Maki v. 
Estate of Ziehm.74 
In Maki, two shareholders equally owned a closely held corpora-
tion. Shareholder A died and Shareholder B filed suit against the es-
 
 72. Id. at 639 (quoting MOORE ET AL., supra note 71, ¶ 23.1.16[1]). 
 73. See Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that the state of Delaware is not ready to loosen the derivative action requirements in a closely 
held corporation setting). 
 74. 391 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (App. Div. 1977) (holding that the claim of misappropria-
tion of corporate funds may not be addressed in a direct action by a stockholder, but must be 
brought in the name of the corporation, since the damages, if any, belong to the corporation). 
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tate of Shareholder A claiming, “the decedent misappropriated the 
assets of the corporation to his own use.”75 The court dismissed 
Shareholder B’s claims, holding that Shareholder B could not bring 
the claim individually.76 
The Maki court held that “a derivative action is the appropriate 
vehicle for the protection of the rights of the corporation’s creditors, 
since corporate liabilities must be extinguished before any corporate 
assets may be distributed to the stockholders.”77 Otherwise, a share-
holder could use a direct action against the corporation to circum-
vent the liabilities that the corporation has to its creditors and all 
benefits from the direct action would be received by the share-
holder.78 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized this important principle in 
the case of Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., where it stated that 
the direct action, if not used correctly, “and in lieu of a derivative ac-
tion, is likely to result in grave injustices, not the least of which is the 
diversion of assets recovered in a lawsuit from creditors of a corpora-
tion to stockholders thereby reversing the long established substan-
tive rules of law” that a creditor has priority over a shareholder “to 
the assets of an insolvent corporation.”79 Hence, allowing only de-
rivative actions as an exclusive remedy when the corporation has 
been damaged protects “the interests of all parties harmed by dam-
age to the corporation.”80 
The reasoning of the Maki court, however, is flawed because it 
does not take into account all types of circumstances that may be 
present in a given action involving a closely held corporation. By re-
quiring a shareholder of a closely held corporation to file a derivative 
action for any harm that the corporation sustains, the court is impli-
edly holding that the procedural requirements of a derivative action 
must be met prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, the 
shareholder would first have to make demand upon the officers or 
directors of the corporation, which in this case was the decedent’s 
estate. The estate of the decedent has a conflict of interest in decid-
ing between the best interests of the estate and the best interests of 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. 614 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah 1980). 
 80. GEVURTZ, supra note 1, § 4.3.1(a), at 391. 
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the corporation. Assuming that the decedent’s estate does not agree 
to bring the suit, the shareholder would have to file a derivative ac-
tion against the estate to recover for the mismanagement of the as-
sets. However, if any judgment is recovered through litigation, the 
judgment will be the property of the corporation and thus will revert 
back to the defendants in the litigation proceedings.81 Thus, unlike a 
direct action that results in a possible recovery by the individual 
shareholder,82 any recovery of a derivative action belongs to the cor-
poration whether it is a publicly held or closely held corporation.83 
Therefore, although the derivative action may provide a remedy for 
shareholders in a publicly held corporation, it can hardly be argued 
that the same type of remedy is available for shareholders in a closely 
held corporation.84 
2. Closely held corporations treated like partnerships 
Another approach quite different than the traditional approach is 
to not apply derivative rules to any type of closely held corporation.85 
The important case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng-
land held that a closely held corporation is essentially an incorpo-
rated partnership and thus minority shareholders should have the 
right to sue individually.86 
In Donahue, a minority shareholder brought an action against 
the officers and directors of a closely held corporation seeking to re-
scind the corporation’s purchase of an officer’s shares.87 The Dona-
hue court reasoned that the similarities in business forms between a 
partnership and a closely held corporation did not warrant a great 
disparity in their legal treatment.88 The court noted that many other 
 
 81. The rationale of courts in allowing the proceeds to revert back to the defendants is 
twofold: (1) the interests of other parties including creditors outweighs recovery by an individ-
ual shareholder and (2) the previous action should provide an incentive to the board of direc-
tors to change future conduct. Id. § 4.3.1(b). 
 82. Id. § 4.3.1(a). 
 83. Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989). 
 84. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 85. See Kirk v. First Nat’l Bank of Columbus, 439 F. Supp. 1141 (M.D. Ga. 1977); see 
also Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). 
 86. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 
1975). 
 87. Id. at 508. 
 88. Id. at 512, 515; see also Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 220 (“Close corporations bear a 
striking resemblance to a partnership. In essence, the ownership of a close corporation is lim-
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courts have ruled that the “close corporation is often little more than 
an ‘incorporated’ or ‘chartered’ partnership.”89 The Donahue court 
further stated that “[m]any close corporations are ‘really partner-
ships, between two or three people who contribute their capital, 
skills, experience and labor.”90 By so holding that a closely held cor-
poration is in essence a partnership, the rule allows courts to convert 
“all intracorporate disputes that would be normally characterized as 
derivative actions into direct actions whenever the case involves a 
closely held corporation.”91 
Some of the policy reasons promulgated by the Donahue court 
involved the fact that because “stockholders in [a] close corporation 
owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the opera-
tion of the enterprise that partners owe to one another,” the proce-
dural rules of derivative lawsuits would be inapplicable in a closely 
held corporate setting where corporate shareholders are little more 
than incorporated partners.92 Other courts have asserted that 
“[w]here several owners own an enterprise together (as they usually 
do in a close corporation), their relationship should be considered a 
fiduciary one similar to the relationship among partners.”93 Even 
Chief Justice Burger, who at the time was a judge on the D.C. Cir-
cuit, voiced his stance on the matter by stating that 
[in] an intimate business venture such as this, stockholders of a 
close corporation occupy a position similar to that of joint adven-
turers and partners. While courts have sometimes declared stock-
holders ‘do not bear toward each other that same relation of trust 
and confidence which prevails in partnerships,’ this view ignores the 
practical realities of the organization and functioning of a small . . . 
corporation organized to carry on a small business enterprise in  
 
 
 
ited to a small number of people who are dependent on each other for the enterprise to suc-
ceed. Just like a partnership, the relationship between the shareholders must be one of trust, 
confidence and loyalty if the close corporation is to thrive.”); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01 cmt. e (1994) [here-
inafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. 
 89. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512. 
 90. Id. at 512 (citing Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 805 (1965)). 
 91. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, § 7.01 cmt. e. 
 92. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
 93. Noakes v. Schoenborn, 841 P.2d 682, 687 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting O’NEAL 
& THOMPSON, supra note 17, § 8.08(3)). 
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which the stockholders, directors, and managers are the same per-
sons.94 
Furthermore, the Donahue court recognized that another gov-
erning body, namely the Internal Revenue Service, has through stat-
ute recognized that Subchapter S corporations are usually closely 
held corporations and for tax purposes are treated exactly like a part-
nership.95 
Although the reasoning of the Donahue court is persuasive, the 
law should not be changed to treat closely held corporations as part-
nerships and exempt shareholders from the derivative lawsuit re-
quirements in all circumstances. Similar to the partnership form and 
unlike a publicly traded corporation, a shareholder in a closely held 
corporation does not have the flexibility or remedy of trading his 
shares in the corporation in a public market. However, despite these 
disadvantages, the corporate form should govern in most circum-
stances and the desire of the corporation’s founders in choosing the 
corporate form over the partnership form should be respected.96 
Furthermore, it is important to consider the interests and rights 
of creditors “since corporate liabilities must be extinguished before 
any corporate assets may be distributed to the stockholders.”97 Fi-
nally, allowing a closely held corporation to be treated as a partner-
ship may give rise to a multiplicity of actions depending on the 
number of shareholders in the corporation. Directors and officers 
could be sued for any type of mismanagement of assets no matter 
how nominal the value. For these reasons, the closely held corporate 
form should not be treated as a partnership in shareholder proceed-
ings. 
3. The moderate approach of the American Law Institute 
The American Law Institute has promulgated a more moderate 
middle approach. The American Law Institute’s proposal developed 
 
 94. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513 (quoting Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 
(D.C. Cir. 1957)). 
 95. Id. at 512 n.12. 
 96. See Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 648 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). Advantages of the 
corporate form include: “(a) Power to take, hold, and convey property in the corporate name; 
(b) Power to sue and to be sued in the corporate name; (c) Centralization of management in 
the board of directors; (d) Ready transferability of interests; (e) Perpetual succession; and (f) 
Limited liability.” HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 20, § 79. 
 97. Maki v. Estate of Ziehm, 391 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (App. Div. 1977). 
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primarily because of a landmark case that was decided in 1956 by the 
Ninth Circuit.98 In Watson v. Button, the court held that a direct ac-
tion may be substituted for a derivative action when a multiplicity of 
actions will not result from the ruling, the corporate creditors will 
not be hurt, and all stockholders will benefit equally from the direct 
ruling.99 The American Law Institute, following the Watson prece-
dent, states: 
In the case of a closely held corporation . . . the court in its discre-
tion may treat an action raising derivative claims as a direct action, 
exempt it from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to 
derivative actions, and order an individual recovery, if it finds that 
to do so will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defen-
dants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the inter-
ests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair dis-
tribution of the recovery among all interested persons.100 
In adopting this rule the American Law Institute stated “the 
concept of a corporate injury that is distinct from any injury to the 
shareholders approaches the fictional in the case of a firm with only a 
handful of shareholders.”101 In essence, what the American Law In-
stitute and the Watson court have done is incorporate three policy 
requirements that determine when minority shareholders in closely 
held corporations must sue derivatively. The American Law Institute 
and Watson then state that when the facts of each individual case sat-
isfy the three policy requirements of the above-cited passage, a de-
rivative lawsuit is no longer warranted and a direct action should be 
allowed. It is important to note that not only does the American Law 
Institute recommend that a direct claim be substituted for a deriva-
 
 98. Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956). 
 99. Id. at 237 (involving two shareholders one of which misappropriated the assets of 
the corporation at the expense of the other shareholder). 
 100. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, § 7.01(d). 
 101. Id. at cmt. e; Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 798 (N.D. 1991) 
(holding that a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation may bring a direct action 
rather than a derivative action). Recent decisions that have recognized the right of a share-
holder of a close corporation to sue directly include: Orsi v. Sunshine Art Studios, Inc., 874 F. 
Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1995); Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); 
Thomas v. Dickson, 301 S.E.2d 49, 51 (Ga. 1983); Steelman v. Mallory, 716 P.2d 1282 
(Idaho 1986); Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1995); Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 
648 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 486 N.E.2d 70, 74 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985);  Yackel v. Kay, 642 N.E.2d 1107 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Noakes v. 
Schoenborn, 841 P.2d 682 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
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tive claim, but the Institute also recommends that any action be ex-
empt “from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to deriva-
tive actions.”102 Thus, a direct action that is used in place of a deriva-
tive action does not need to follow the procedural requirements of a 
derivative action. 
The balanced approach that the American Law Institute promul-
gates is correct in not making every action a direct action, but in al-
lowing the courts to have discretion to decide when the three policy 
requirements are met and then to treat the closely held corporation 
accordingly. However, the rationale of the first policy requirement of 
avoiding a multiplicity of actions may be misplaced because in a 
closely held corporation there are usually very few shareholders, and 
where there are few shareholders (each of whom may bring one 
claim), there cannot be a multiplicity of actions, so the policy re-
quirement results in a non-issue. In contrast, avoiding a multiplicity 
of actions does matter in a publicly held corporation because it 
would be overwhelming for both the courts and the individual cor-
poration to have a different lawsuit by every shareholder over the 
same claim. The second policy requirement respects the Maki court 
in protecting creditors’ interests before the interests of the individual 
shareholders. Finally, the third requirement ensures that not only 
will the shareholder bringing the action benefit from the decision of 
the court, but also ensures that other shareholders are protected in 
the recovery process. 
B. The Aurora Court’s Partial Adoption of the  
American Law Institute’s Proposal 
The Utah Supreme Court partially adopted the American Law 
Institute’s proposal as stated above. The court held that “a court 
may allow a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation to 
proceed directly against corporate officers.”103 However, the court 
also held that “permitting a shareholder to proceed directly for 
claims against a closely held corporation does not exempt the share-
holder from the contemporaneous ownership rule.”104 Unlike the 
American Law Institute’s recommendation that direct actions not be 
 
 102. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, § 7.01(d). 
 103. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 
1998). 
 104. Id. 
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subject to the “restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative 
actions,”105 the Utah Supreme Court requires direct actions to now 
jump through the procedural requirement of the contemporaneous 
ownership rule. The remainder of this Note will show why the Utah 
Supreme Court was correct in its first holding of allowing derivative 
actions to be substituted with direct actions in the case of a closely 
held corporation.106 This Note will also discuss why the Utah Su-
preme Court was incorrect when it applied the contemporaneous 
ownership requirement to direct proceedings in a closely held corpo-
ration. 
1. The Utah Supreme Court correctly allowed minority shareholders to 
sue a closely held corporation’s officers directly 
The Utah Supreme Court correctly held that a minority share-
holder in a closely held corporation should be able to file a direct ac-
tion instead of a derivative action against the corporation’s officers. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court correctly held that in a direct 
action the minority shareholder is not required to meet “many of the 
procedural requirements of a derivative action.”107 However, the 
court should have also held that the contemporaneous ownership re-
quirement does not apply to direct actions filed against closely held 
corporations. 
“[T]he procedural rules often applicable to derivative actions—
such as a requirement that the plaintiff post a security-for-expenses 
bond—often make little sense in the context of a dispute between 
persons who are effectively incorporated partners.”108 Furthermore, it 
is difficult to envision a minority shareholder required to make de-
mand on the closely held corporation’s board, where the board may 
have very well caused the harm the corporation suffered. “[T]he like-
lihood of a disinterested board is far smaller in [a closely held corpo-
ration] because the majority stockholders are likely also to be the 
 
 105. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, § 7.01(d). 
 106. Recently, the Utah Supreme Court attempted to distinguish part of its correct hold-
ing in Aurora. See Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 991 P.2d 584, 588 (Utah 
1999) (“The injury alleged in Aurora Credit was suffered uniquely by Aurora Credit and 
therefore was much more direct than is a typical derivative claim.”); see also Warner v. DMG 
Color, Inc., 20 P.3d 868, 873 (Utah 2000). 
 107. Aurora, 970 P.2d at 1281. 
 108. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, § 7.01 cmt. e. 
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firm’s managers.”109 Thus, as previously discussed, a conflict of inter-
est arises for the board members to maintain their fiduciary duty to 
look after the corporation’s best interests, but at the same time not 
agree to sue themselves and be held liable for the damages that they 
have caused. Hence, most directors or officers do not agree to insti-
gate this action. 
A new problem arises after demand is made upon the corpora-
tion’s board and the action is refused by the board. The share-
holder’s only remedy is to file a derivative action. However, as dis-
cussed previously, any recovery or judgment that is awarded from the 
derivative lawsuit belongs to the corporation and not to the individ-
ual shareholder.110 A number of courts have recognized that “it is of-
ten difficult and futile to bring a derivative action against a closely 
held corporation”111 because “[e]ven if a minority shareholder over-
comes procedural hurdles in a derivative action, a strong disadvan-
tage is that any recovery accrues to the corporation and hence re-
mains under the control of the [majority shareholders, the] very 
parties who may have been defendants in the litigation.”112 This is 
why some courts have permitted “oppressed minority shareholders 
to bring direct suits for breaches of fiduciary duties the majority 
shareholders owe minority shareholders even though the plaintiffs’ 
grievance is based primarily on damage to the corporation. Courts 
need not ignore the reality that the litigation is really a dispute 
among shareholders.”113 “Thus, a derivative remedy is not an effec-
tive remedy because the wrongdoers would be the principal benefici-
aries of the recovery.”114 
Another important policy implication in favor of adopting the 
American Law Institute’s approach is the fact that a shareholder in a 
closely held corporation typically “has a substantial percentage of his 
personal assets invested in the corporation.”115 In contrast to a 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989). 
 111. Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 647–48 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that 
“if a corporation is closely held, a court in its discretion, may treat an action raising derivative 
claims as a direct action” (quoting AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01(d), at 713 (Tentative Draft No. 11, 1991)). 
 112. Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 798 (N.D. 1991). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 221. 
 115. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 
1975) (citing Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583–84 (1965)). 
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shareholder of a publicly held corporation, the minority shareholder 
cannot sell his stock for market value on a public stock exchange. 
Furthermore, just as a partner in a partnership “cannot transfer his 
interest in the partnership so as to give his assignee a right to partici-
pate in the management or business affairs of the continuing partner-
ship without the agreement of the other partners” so too can a 
closely held corporation’s shareholders impose restrictions on the 
sale of any stock of the corporation.116 The minority shareholder’s 
only recourse is to deal with the wrongdoing majority sharehold-
ers.117 Where a shareholder in a large, publicly held corporation can 
find many interested people or entities willing to buy his stock, the 
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation is “trapped in a 
disadvantageous situation from which he cannot be easily extricated” 
because there is generally no available market for his shares.118 Thus, 
it is very difficult for a minority shareholder in a closely held corpora-
tion to regain her investment when the majority shareholders harm 
the corporation in some way. 
Despite these very persuasive arguments in favor of adopting the 
American Law Institute’s approach, many courts have sharply criti-
cized the American Law Institute’s proposal. In Bagdon v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., the court stated: 
Ohio, like a few other states, has expanded the ‘special injury’ doc-
trine into a general exception for closely held corporations, treating 
them as if they were partnerships. . . . The American Law Institute 
recommends that other states do the same. The premise of this ex-
tension may be questioned. Corporations are not partnerships. 
Whether to incorporate entails a choice of many formalities. Com-
mercial rules should be predictable; this objective is best served by 
treating corporations as what they are, allowing the investors and 
other participants to vary the rules by contract if they think devia-
tions are warranted. So it is understandable that not all states have 
joined the parade.119 
 
 116. See id. at 512 n.13 (citations omitted). 
 117. Id. at 515. 
 118. See Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 220. 
 119. Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 383–84 (7th Cir. 1990) (ci-
tations omitted). In a recent decision, the Virginia Supreme Court adopted the rationale of the 
Bagdon court and rejected the American Law Institute’s proposal. See Simmons v. Miller, 544 
S.E.2d 666, 675 (Va. 2001). 
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Furthermore, in Landstrom v. Shaver,120 the South Dakota Su-
preme Court argued that minority shareholders in closely held cor-
porations are adequately protected by putting the proceeds of recov-
ery back into the corporation because the value of the minority 
shareholder’s stock is restored to its original value.121 The Landstrom 
court also held that allowing the recovery to inure to the corporation 
guarantees the protection of all shareholders and creditors and re-
spects the separate and distinct features of the corporate entity.122 
The Landstrom court categorically rejected the American Law Insti-
tute’s proposal by reasoning that the Institute’s position would po-
tentially allow minority shareholders to force majority shareholders 
“by litigation (or even in some cases, the threat of it) to buy out the 
minority shareholders’ shares ‘which corporate law rarely if ever re-
quires.’”123 
In summary, both courts argued that maintaining respect for the 
corporate entity is of supreme importance. The Bagdon court argued 
that corporate law should be predictable, and the Landstrom court 
further asserted that all shareholders and creditors should be pro-
tected in any action that is filed to remedy a corporate harm. The 
Landstrom court felt that minority interests were adequately pro-
tected by the requirement that proceeds of the action flow directly to 
the corporation because the value of all shares, including those be-
longing to minority shareholders, would be increased. The Land-
strom court also expressed concern regarding the possibility of major-
ity shareholders being forced into buying out minority shareholders’ 
ownership interests under the threat of litigation. 
 Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court was correct to adopt 
the American Law Institute’s proposal because it allows courts to use 
their own discretion in taking into account the factors emphasized by 
both the Bagdon and Landstrom courts. The American Law Insti-
tute’s approach still protects creditors before shareholders and also 
requires that one shareholder not be able to recover proceeds at the 
expense of another. In addition, the Bagdon court’s argument that 
the corporate form must be respected is not without blemish. The 
Bagdon court, by holding that a corporation should never be treated 
 
 120. 1997 SD 25, 561 N.W.2d 1 (1997). 
 121. Id. at 15. 
 122. Id. at 14. 
 123. Id. at 15 (citation omitted). 
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as a partnership, impliedly held that a closely held corporation should 
always be governed by the same rules that govern publicly traded 
corporations. While such a position may be reasonable and fitting in 
most circumstances, this Note has offered various circumstances un-
der which the rules that apply to publicly held corporations should 
not be applied to closely held corporations. For example, the Land-
strom court concluded that receiving an appreciation in the value of 
her shares through the recovery process is the only remedy available 
to a minority shareholder.124 But this view fails to take into account 
the crucial factor of control; majority shareholders are ultimately in 
charge of the proceeds recovered by the corporation. The majority 
shareholders, who are the wrongdoers in the lawsuit, are also the 
principal beneficiaries because they control the recovery’s ultimate 
use. The minority shareholder is therefore left powerless and with lit-
tle remedy. Typically a minority shareholder is someone who “has a 
substantial percentage of his personal assets invested in the corpora-
tion.”125 These minority shareholders are left with two options: they 
can (1) hope that the recovery proceeds are used by the majority 
shareholders in a manner that will ultimately increase the value of the 
corporation, or (2) sell their stock in the corporation because of 
strained relations with the majority shareholders. Many minority 
shareholders may be unwilling to explore the first option because of 
distrust arising from mismanagement by the majority shareholders in 
the first instance. The only remaining course of action then becomes 
the second option. “Thus, in a close corporation, the minority 
stockholders may be trapped in a disadvantageous situation. No out-
sider would knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged mi-
nority. The outsider would have the same difficulties. To cut losses, 
the minority stockholder may be compelled to deal with the major-
ity.”126 Hence, the most plausible method of recourse available to a 
minority shareholder will likely be to sell her shares to the majority 
shareholders with the majority holding all or most of the bargaining 
power with regard to price. The end result would be the opposite 
outcome of what the Landstrom court intended, but this time it 
would be the minority shareholder being forced to sell her shares to 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 
1975) (citing Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583–84 (1965)). 
 126. Id. at 515. 
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the majority shareholders, a result “which corporate law rarely if ever 
requires.”127 
2. The Utah Supreme Court incorrectly applied the contemporaneous 
ownership doctrine to direct lawsuits 
The Aurora court incorrectly held that “permitting a shareholder 
to proceed directly for claims against a closely held corporation does 
not exempt the shareholder from the contemporaneous ownership 
rule.”128 In essence, what the court said was that now not only de-
rivative actions, but also all direct actions by shareholders against 
closely held corporations must meet the contemporaneous owner-
ship requirements of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. 
The purpose of the contemporaneous ownership requirement “is 
to prevent ‘strike suits,’ where individuals purchase shares in a corpo-
ration with litigious motives. In the absence of the contemporaneous 
ownership rule, subsequent purchasers of shares could reap a windfall 
from any recovery in a derivative proceeding which was not consid-
ered in the purchase price of their shares.”129 Stated another way, the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement is intended to (1) prevent 
individuals from buying a stock and then pursuing litigation on mat-
ters that occurred prior to their ownership of the stock,130 (2) pre-
vent shareholders from buying into a corporation at a devalued price 
and then receiving a windfall from advantageous litigation on mat-
ters that occurred prior to their ownership of the stock,131 and (3) 
prevent a multiplicity of suits being filed by various stockholders.132 
It was incorrect for the Utah Supreme Court to apply the con-
temporaneous ownership requirement to direct actions filed against 
closely held corporations.133 The contemporaneous ownership re-
quirement is not the only way to protect closely held corporations 
 
 127. Landstrom, 561 N.W.2d at 15 (quoting Frank v. Hadesman & Frank, Inc., 83 F.3d 
158, 162 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 128. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 
1998). 
 129. 13 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 5981.10. 
 130. See Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315, 317 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 131. See Bank of Santa Fe v. Petty, 867 P.2d 431, 434 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). 
 132. DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 597 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
 133. For example, the state of California has left broad discretion to the courts as to 
when the contemporaneous ownership requirement should be applied even to derivative pro-
ceedings. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(1) (West 1990). 
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from strike suits. For example, as stated previously, many owners of 
closely held corporations: 
impose restrictions on transfers to stock designed to prevent out-
siders who are unacceptable to the other stockholders from acquir-
ing an interest in the close corporation. These restrictions often 
take the form of agreements among the stockholders and the cor-
poration or by-laws which give the corporation or the other stock-
holders a right of ‘first refusal’ when any stockholder desires to sell 
his shares.134 
The contemporaneous ownership requirement’s purpose of 
eliminating strike suits is moot in closely held corporations because 
two other factors already serve that purpose, namely, the lack of a 
public market for the trading of closely held shares and the small 
number of shares outstanding in a closely held corporation. These 
two factors make it virtually impossible for someone to buy into 
closely held stock and receive a windfall from advantageous litiga-
tion. 
The contemporaneous ownership requirement is also based on 
the assumption of the “efficient market theory.” The efficient market 
theory “posits that the price of a security reflects all publicly available 
information about a firm, and that prices react almost instantane-
ously and in an unbiased manner to any new information.”135 “Re-
cent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that 
the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects 
all publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepre-
sentations.”136 The market acts “as the unpaid agent of the investor, 
informing him that given all the information available to it, the value 
of the stock is worth the market price.”137 
The contemporaneous ownership requirement relies on the effi-
cient market theory because it assumes that when a new stockholder 
buys into a corporation, all material, relevant information will be 
used to price the stock in an efficient market. Thus, if there is out-
 
 134. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 n.13 (Mass. 
1975). 
 135. Dennis, supra note 25, at 374–75; see also In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 
960, 975 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that the efficient market theory holds that “all announce-
ments of financial results and other developments are quickly incorporated into the ever-
changing market price of the company’s stock”). 
 136. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). 
 137. Id. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)). 
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standing litigation involving the corporation, the litigation will al-
ready be reflected in the stock price. Therefore, according to the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement, stockholders who buy 
stock after the “time of the act or omission complained of”138 should 
not be able to participate in the recovery of the litigation. Otherwise, 
these stockholders would receive a windfall. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated that the contemporaneous 
ownership requirement should apply to direct actions because of the 
assumption that any purchaser of the stock 
who becomes an owner after the occurrence of wrongful corporate 
conduct paid a price for the stock reflecting the misdeed and that, 
therefore, the purchaser suffers no injury from the wrongful con-
duct. This assumption is equally as true for the purchaser of stock 
in a closely held corporation as in a large publicly traded corpora-
tion.139 
Hence, the Utah Supreme Court assumes that just as publicly 
held corporate stock is traded on an efficient market, so too is closely 
held corporate stock. However, this assumption is in error. As stated 
previously the definition of a closely held corporation is a corpora-
tion with “(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market 
for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder par-
ticipation in the management, direction and operations of the corpo-
ration.”140 Focusing on element two of the definition shows that a 
closely held corporation has “no ready market for the corporate 
stock.”141 Because a closely held corporation by definition does not 
have a ready market for its stock, it is incorrect to assume that after 
the wrong occurred, a purchaser of the stock “paid a price for the 
stock reflecting the misdeed.”142 Thus, a shareholder that buys into a 
closely held corporation that suffers some type of harm will most 
likely buy in at a price that is greater than market value because the 
stock is traded on an inefficient market that has inadequate informa-
 
 138. 13 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 5981. 
 139. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 
1998). 
 140. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 
1975); see also Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989) (“[A] close corporation is 
a corporation with a few shareholders and whose corporate shares are not generally traded on a 
securities market.”). 
 141. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511. 
 142. Aurora, 970 P.2d at 1281. 
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tion to adjust the price downward. But if the corporation does not 
pursue the claim through litigation, the shareholder will not be able 
to recoup part of her investment because at the time the corporation 
was harmed she did not own the stock. More importantly, even the 
American Law Institute has recognized that in circumstances where 
(1) the wrongdoing was not made public, (2) the purchasing party 
did not know about the wrongdoing, or (3) the stock price did not 
reflect the wrongdoing, the contemporaneous ownership require-
ment should not be applied.143 
Furthermore, even if closely held corporate stock were traded on 
an efficient market it still does not mean that the contemporaneous 
ownership requirement should apply to direct actions. In an efficient 
market the contemporaneous ownership requirement does not al-
ways prevent a windfall from accruing to the purchasing party. For 
example, even if the purchaser knows about the damage to the cor-
poration, “this does not mean that the share price will incorporate a 
discount fully reflecting the damage. If the buyer expects that the 
corporation can recover compensation from the wrongdoer, then the 
price of the shares should reflect this potential recovery” discounted 
by the costs of the litigation and the possibility of non-recovery by 
the corporation.144 
In situations in which the wrongdoing was not fully disclosed, 
courts should not assume there will be a windfall. Nor should courts 
assume that there is a windfall when the wrongdoing is disclosed, but 
the party purchasing control buys his or her shares from stockholders 
who were not the wrongdoers. After all, in this instance, the buyer 
presumably paid a price reflecting the possibility of corporate recov-
ery.145 
Hence, the Utah Supreme Court was wrong to assume that the 
efficient market theory applies to the trading of closely held corpo-
rate stock. For the above stated reasons, the contemporaneous own-
ership requirement should not apply to direct actions in closely held 
corporations. 
 
 143. GEVURTZ, supra note 1, § 4.3.2 (citing PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
supra note 88, § 7.02(a)(1)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court’s holding in Aurora was 
correct insofar that it allows minority shareholders of closely held 
corporations to sue the corporation directly for injuries sustained by 
the corporation. However, the decision to require direct actions to 
meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement of Rule 23.1 was 
incorrect based upon the analysis in Part IV of this Note. The con-
temporaneous ownership requirement’s purpose is to avoid strike 
suits and is based on the premise that all stock is traded on an effi-
cient market. As Part IV of this Note illustrated, the small number of 
shares outstanding and the lack of a public market in a closely held 
corporate setting serve the purpose of eliminating strike suits. Thus, 
closely held corporations do not need to be governed by the con-
temporaneous ownership requirement. Furthermore, it is incorrect 
to assume that stock of a closely held corporation is traded on an ef-
ficient market because a closely held corporation by definition is a 
corporation that has “no ready market for the corporate stock.”146 
Therefore, Utah courts in the future should not apply the contempo-
raneous ownership requirement to direct actions filed by minority 
shareholders of closely held corporations. 
Robbie G. Yates 
 
 
 146. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511. 
